Thanks to a form of genetic engineering technology known as a gene drive, it is now possible to modify or even eliminate a wild species in its natural habitat, bypassing the laws of inheritance that have governed nature for millennia. The power to deliver 鈥渆xtinction to order鈥� is potentially immense 鈥� as is the political challenge.
The technology works by driving a gene throughout a population, meaning the plants or animals containing the drives could impact ecosystems that cross not just country borders, but entire continents. And so far, there is no such thing as a safe gene drive or a reliable way to rein one in after release.
This potential for far-reaching effects has triggered a 鈥渃onstitutional moment鈥�, a point when we are forced to confront fundamental questions. When is it acceptable to eliminate or re-engineer a wild species? Who decides and how?
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A number of authoritative bodies, including the US National Academy of Sciences, have called for international governance of the technology. In a , the Sustainability Council of New Zealand, where we work, suggested that countries proposing a gene-drive trial or release must first gain the consent of each country that could be affected, a process we call 鈥渃ollective consent鈥�.
Biosafety principle
This requirement is based on the principle at the core of the international biosafety protocol established through the United Nations. It says that countries importing living, genetically modified organisms have the right to prior, informed consent.
But consent is not enough. Uncertainty abounds where gene drives are concerned, so it is essential to apply the precautionary principle when undertaking risk assessment and to evaluate gene-drive proposals against alternatives that could achieve the same goal. Liability for any harm caused should also lie squarely with the originating nation.
The prospect that gene drives could well do more harm than good has not deterred the US military and Silicon Valley philanthropists, who are currently bankrolling the research. Nor has it dampened the enthusiasm of those promoting an unproven technology as a game changer to tackle crises in public health, conservation and agriculture.
But they have been slow to acknowledge the challenge of governing this new technology. Governments must make it clear there will be no concessions on regulations that are vital to safeguarding public health and the environment. Making concessions would unfairly advantage gene drives against competing approaches that could deliver similar outcomes, yet with less risk.
Methods of curbing the potency of this new technology have been proposed, such as trying to reduce the lifespan and geographic spread of a gene drive, but none has yet been demonstrated and all carry similar risks.
Genetic Wild West
A failure to insist on proper governance invites a Wild West of unilateral actions without proper consideration of risks, alternatives and the consequences for other countries.
The UN Convention on Biological Diversity and its protocols could be adapted to deliver what is needed. It is the most suitable structure currently available on which to build gene-drive governance that is fit for purpose. And until that is completed, international agreement is needed that no outdoor trials or releases will take place.
However we do it, there is no time to waste as the technology is moving fast. Just three years after gene drive was first proposed, scientists are hailing significant progress in gene drives for mosquitoes and mice.
In November, when the UN convention parties meet in Egypt, the international community has an opportunity to lay the ground to govern gene drive. It should not let this opportunity pass.
