There is no let-up in the war of words between US president Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The latest volley came from the latter, with more provocative over the Pacific. With Trump , expect more of this.
The continual threats and insults give the impression of an imminent nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula. Are they bluffing, or is the risk real? I favour the former.
As far as Trump is concerned, some analysts believe he is deliberately playing the same 鈥渕adman strategy鈥� against North Korea that US president Richard Nixon used to bargain with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. The same may be true of Kim.
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That strategy goes like this: create an air of irrationality and the chance of an unpredictable response to keep your opponent in line. During the cold war, Nixon鈥檚 staff reportedly fed their Soviet counterparts a narrative about their inability to control the man with his finger on the nuclear button.
Today, a similar US narrative arguably emerges from the president鈥檚 tweets and speeches. We get Trump鈥檚 should North Korea continue making threats. North Korea鈥檚 leader does the same via the country鈥檚 state TV service.
Just hot air?
Why do I think this is all bluff? Because game theory, rooted in the maths of strategic thinking, offers insight into possible reasons why that is an approach worth pursuing. Analysing it this way involves starting from the possible outcomes 鈥� conflict or bargained solution 鈥� and working backwards to consider possible costs and losses.
For Trump, a successful bargain to dial down North Korea鈥檚 nuclear ambitions relies on the threat of retaliation to non-compliance being credible. Credible means that threats could map into actions and thus outcomes.
A pre-emptive and unprovoked conventional strike on North Korea鈥檚 nuclear facilities raises the obvious risk of escalation into a nuclear exchange. That is utterly incompatible with US national interests 鈥� the most obvious reason being the , and the hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions, of deaths. In game theory terms, these threats are 鈥渘on-credible鈥� because they will never be carried out in a rational world.
Perhaps the only way Trump can create an air that the risk of a US attack is real, possibly to try to force the hand of the international community, is the madman strategy. The same goes for North Korea, well aware that triggering war would be suicide. Both sides know this, and bluff in the knowledge that the threats from either cannot credibly be made real.
Building support
There is another, stronger, possibility why the madman dialogue endures between the two 鈥� because it boosts both politically at home. , at least, seem to bear that out among Republicans.
Seemingly unhinged threats made in the knowledge they never need to be fulfilled play to their respective supporters 鈥� hardcore Trump voters in the US, and senior political and military figures in North Korea.
The appeal for Trump is that he appears decisive and strong, 鈥渕aking America great again鈥� while always being able to blame the system of checks and balances in Congress and his national security advisers for having blocked a decisive strike against North Korea 鈥� thereby increasing popularity among his electoral base.
As for Kim, he hopes he can boost his grip on power by proudly claiming the world鈥檚 most powerful nation chickened out of conflict at the sight of his magnificent new arsenal. For both leaders, a madman strategy seems to be a win-win.
Read more: Can the US really nuke North Korea without starting a world war?;
Seismic tests hint North Korea鈥檚 nuke is its first hydrogen bomb;
Would a North Korean space nuke really lay waste to the US?
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