Amber Rudd is at it again. Today, the UK home secretary took to the pages of to continue her crusade against end-to-end encryption in messaging apps like WhatsApp.
She retreads the same argument we鈥檝e seen her 鈥� and prime minister Theresa May 鈥� make on multiple occasions. If a messaging app is end-to-end encrypted, then only the participants in a conversation can read the messages in it. It鈥檚 impossible for anyone 鈥� even the company running the service 鈥� to intercept or read those messages.
鈥淩eal people鈥�, Rudd writes, don鈥檛 need this level of security. She claims that end-to-end encryption only benefits terrorists, who can communicate their plans safe in the knowledge they can鈥檛 be overheard. 鈥淭hey use the very best of innovation for the most evil of ends,鈥� she writes.
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Is trying to protect your privacy futile?
The crux of her argument is simple. Only those with something to hide, she says, benefit from end-to-end encryption. 鈥淲ho uses WhatsApp because it is end-to-end encrypted, rather than because it is鈥� user-friendly and cheap?鈥� The home secretary, once again, is wrong about that. Here are a few reasons why 鈥渞eal people鈥� need end-to-end encryption.
Privacy
You don鈥檛 have to be a terrorist to want your conversations to stay private 鈥� it鈥檚 a fundamental human right, which a billion people worldwide use WhatsApp to enjoy. Doctors . And UK foreign secretary Boris Johnson uses WhatsApp to , without his boss, the prime minister, finding out.
Even the government鈥檚 supporters agree that these conversations should stay encrypted. MPs, special advisers and campaign staff all use WhatsApp to discuss sensitive information, writes , 鈥渟afe in the knowledge that they are using a service which is securely encrypted and therefore private鈥�. Without end-to-end encryption, they can forget about that.
Finance
Encrypted messaging apps are a relatively secure way of exchanging sensitive information such as bank details. Even if the app鈥檚 servers were accessed by hackers, end-to-end encryption makes it impossible for anyone to read those messages. Sending your bank details via an unencrypted channel like an email runs the risk of interception 鈥� people have lost vast sums when house purchase payments arranged via email by criminals.
Data security
From Yahoo to the Democratic National Committee, there have been no shortage of high-profile attacks targeting personal data. No company or organisation is invulnerable to those attacks, but end-to-end encryption means that when they do happen, individuals can be assured that their private information won鈥檛 be leaked.
Rudd鈥檚 proposal
Instead of the current situation, the home secretary envisions a halfway house where messages are encrypted most of the time, but when the government wants to have a peek, that encryption can be swept aside for a moment. But there is no such thing as half-hearted, end-to-end encryption. Either messages are fully encrypted or they are not. Rudd herself contemplates this argument for a moment in her Telegraph column. 鈥淭hat might be true in theory,鈥� she writes. 鈥淏ut the reality is different.鈥�
Rudd is wrong. End-to-end encryption is all or nothing. A back door in encrypted messaging apps is the same as having no end-to-end encryption at all. Rudd鈥檚 halfway house is a practical impossibility. Indeed, Rudd has no idea how it might actually be achieved. In her article, she explicitly rules out banning end-to-end encryption, but continues to demand changes that amount to exactly that.
The home secretary ends with the hope that Silicon Valley鈥檚 tech geniuses can come up with a way of squaring the circle when she meets them today at the first .
If they have read her column, representatives from the tech giants will know they are facing someone who doesn鈥檛 grasp the technical reality of end-to-end encryption or why it is important for so many people. They have a long and frustrating meeting ahead of them.
