
The US Central Intelligence Agency has reportedly informed the US Senate that Russian hackers attempted to interfere with the recent US presidential election. Moreover, it is understood to have asserted that these actions had the .
President-elect Trump has ridiculed these disclosures (as has Moscow), setting himself on a possible collision course with agencies he will need for an effective presidency come January 2017. So outgoing president Barack Obama has until then to respond to Russia, but his options and time are limited.
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Obama is being urged to act quickly and resolutely, in defence of democracy. He has bought himself a little time by of historical Russian electoral interference before he leaves office. This would presumably influence the nature of any parting shot at Russian president Vladimir Putin from the outgoing president.
What could Obama do? A strong diplomatic rebuke is one option. But for all the talk of a political “red line” being crossed, it is difficult to see how that will change Russian behaviour. The intelligence agencies of have expressed similar concerns about Russian interference in electoral processes. Putin seems unlikely to be cowed by such “naming and shaming”. Nor were the Chinese when called out for cyberespionage in 2014.
Any such response would be complicated by two further factors. The first is the US track record of electoral interference, particularly in . The second involves Edward Snowden, and its intelligence agencies. On both counts, the US appears hypocritical, as Putin will doubtless remind it.
Cyber skirmish?
What is more interesting is . The US has reserved the right to respond to cyber provocations in kind. It would be speculation to suggest that the US is undertaking computer network operations in direct response to the alleged Russian actions. However, it would also be .
We simply do not know what sorts of cyber skirmishing may be happening between the US and Russia, nor how effective they might be.
Various unofficial suggestions for a response have been made, from hacking Putin’s emails to disrupting online censorship in Russia to revealing possible offshore funds held by officials. All this is potentially dangerous: the task for both sides should be to prevent conflict escalation, or damage to civilian assets on either side.
A more obvious and less risky battleground is the global media. It may be counter-intuitive in this supposedly “post-truth” political environment, but the US needs to present the evidence by which the country’s intelligence reached its reported conclusions. Suitably redacted to protect sources and methods, this would communicate to Russia that the US has its story straight and the evidence to prove it.
Such a move, made quickly and smartly, would also demonstrate political will to resolve this issue. While not necessarily altering Russia’s behaviour now, it might convince other states to support initiatives to censure or combat a new phase in Russian information warfare.