It was probably the most important research on flu in years, but most people won鈥檛 be allowed to read it all. As 快猫短视频 revealed in September, researchers at the University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, created a mutated H5N1 bird flu that could go pandemic 鈥� and would be lethal to half its victims.
Bioterrorism experts in the US immediately questioned whether the method for making such a plague should be published. Now the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has recommended that the 鈥済eneral conclusions be published, but that the manuscripts not include the methodological and other details that could enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm鈥�.
鈥淲e will respect the advice and try to publish in censored form,鈥� says the study鈥檚 lead author, Ron Fouchier of the University of Rotterdam. 鈥淏ut we still believe the detailed data should be published. We have the moral obligation to share the details with those that need to know.鈥� Researchers must investigate the threat posed by H5N1 evolving in the wild, he believes, as that far outweighs the harm that hypothetical bioterrorists might do.
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鈥淭he great benefit of the work is that it shows how easily H5N1 could mutate to cause a pandemic of terrible severity, and that we really can鈥檛 afford to scale down our preparedness,鈥� says , head of the centre for respiratory infection at Imperial College London.
The bioterrorism science advisory board says that the US government is developing a mechanism to give 鈥渟ecure access鈥� to risky information 鈥渢o those with a legitimate need鈥�, and an 鈥渙versight policy [for] evaluating research that has the potential to be misused鈥�.
Not just US
Fouchier does not see how a mechanism outside the standard scientific channels would be possible, but should one be imposed, 鈥減ublic health experts rather than biosecurity officials should decide who to share the information with鈥�, and they should not only be US citizens, he says.
鈥淚f work on viruses in the western world comes under government control, we will rapidly fall behind the hundreds of well-equipped labs that are not under those controls,鈥� fears Openshaw. He says that the existing rules balancing risks and benefits of research 鈥渕ostly get it about right鈥�.
D. A. Henderson of the University of Pittsburgh, who led the eradication of smallpox, notes that virologists already review and regulate work with smallpox virus. But flu could be a worse threat, and 鈥渟pecial measures are warranted鈥�.
The Rotterdam research will be published in the journal Science accompanied by explanations about why it was done, and the measures taken to ensure the virus did not escape.
