The International Atomic Energy Agency says Iran has been secretly developing nuclear weapons. 快猫短视频 takes closer look at its major new report
What did the International Atomic Energy Agency find?
Through various clandestine projects, it appears that Iran made concerted attempts between 1998 and 2003 to develop a nuclear bomb, says the (IAEA) in a .
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The report leaves several important questions unanswered, however. The big one is whether those activities have continued or resumed, and if so whether Iran now poses a genuine nuclear threat to its neighbours.
Another important question is whether Iran possesses weapons-grade enriched uranium-235, and if so how much. Nor is it clear whether the country has the capacity to produce this material.
Whatever Iran鈥檚 true intentions, the IAEA鈥檚 report provides unprecedented detail about the scale and ambition of Iran鈥檚 original clandestine nuclear weapons programme, called 鈥淎MAD鈥�, until it was officially halted in 2003. We answer some key questions here about what the IAEA found and how significant it is.
What are the most important outcomes of the IAEA鈥檚 report?
Probably the most important is the rich technical detail, which provides 鈥渟trong indicators鈥� of possible nuclear weapon development in a dedicated programme leading up to 2003. By contrast, Iran has always denied that it wants to produce nuclear bombs, a claim repeated by Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who maintains that the country鈥檚 nuclear programme is purely civilian.
If the programme was halted all that time ago, why has it taken the IAEA this long to expose it?
The IAEA says it has not had sufficient confidence in its sources to make its concerns public. However, the current report is based on information from four mutually corroborating sources.
A key source is a compendium of about 1000 pages of reports and data from a single member state, probably the US, although the agency does not say which. The IAEA also says it has corroborating information from 10 other of its member states and from data collected from its own visits and inspections in Iran. The agency also has information from Iranian officials.
Could the IAEA have been pressured to produce a report that could be used to justify military strikes against Iran?
That is possible, but unlikely. Expert commentators say that if anything the report exposes Iran鈥檚 lack of progress towards making a bomb, reducing any possible justification for attacks. The US Arms Control Association based in Washington DC says that 鈥渢alk of military strikes against Iranian nuclear and military targets is unhelpful and counterproductive鈥�. Much more productive, it says , would be 鈥減ursuit of a negotiated agreement鈥� to discourage any nuclear ambitions that Iran still has.
What鈥檚 needed to make a nuclear bomb?
Weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, for a start. But a host of other complex technologies is needed, too, and that鈥檚 what makes the IAEA鈥檚 report so intriguing. Once a country has enough uranium for a bomb, it needs to develop spherical containers in which the material can be instantaneously compressed, or imploded, so it is sufficiently dense for a nuclear chain reaction to begin.
This compression requires microscopic detonators on the inside of the container, finely tuned to go off simultaneously and with exactly the right force to spark a nuclear explosion. A bomb also needs a source of neutrons to trigger the chain reaction.
Even if a country solves all of those problems, it needs to be sure that the bomb can survive the journey to its destination, possibly in a missile. It also needs facilities and computing programs to develop and physically test all of these technologies. The IAEA鈥檚 report reveals that just about all of these technologies were under development in Iran and may still be.
What were the main developments?
Through a so-called 鈥済reen salt鈥� project, Iran sought a source of uranium suitable for enrichment to weapons-grade material. Civilian nuclear fuel contains less than 1 per cent of uranium by weight, but by repeatedly centrifuging it, the content can ultimately be concentrated to the 80 or 90 per cent needed for bombs.
Did it succeed?
Iran has built at least two facilities for fuel enrichment, at Natanz and Fordow, which since 2005 have both been generating 20-per-cent-enriched uranium. This is in defiance of the United Nations Security Council鈥檚 demands for production to be suspended. But there鈥檚 no evidence of enrichment beyond 20 per cent.
Does Iran have enough material for a bomb yet, and how soon could it make one?
If its current stockpile of enriched uranium was further enriched, it could provide enough for two weapons within about two years, according an analysis by of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a think tank based in London. But to produce a handful of warheads would require years of work in a clandestine facility. 鈥淔ortunately for the world, Iran has not been able to keep its facilities secret,鈥� he says.
How many of the other technologies vital for producing bombs has Iran been engaged in?
The IAEA found considerable evidence that Iran was developing components which could be applied in nuclear weapons. These include the sophisticated detonators needed for nuclear bombs, and 鈥渕ultipoint initiation systems鈥� that refine detonation waves to produce a perfectly uniform compression of the nuclear material. The IAEA also found evidence of the high-speed cameras needed to monitor the shock waves produced by these devices.
Couldn鈥檛 all these technologies be applied to civilian uses?
Possibly, but what makes the IAEA鈥檚 evidence damning is that the dimensions of the hemispheres and detonators that Iran tested exactly matched those of the payload chamber of Iran鈥檚 Shahab 3 missile system, which could be used to deliver a bomb.
So Iran was actively marrying all of its 鈥渂omb development鈥� work to its missile delivery system?
Indeed. Through what became known as Project 111, researchers performed many stress experiments designed to ensure that a bomb could survive blast-off and flight.
What other evidence emerged?
Much nuclear-bomb development relies on the testing of surrogate materials and the IAEA found documents showing that Iran was using tungsten as a simulated nuclear explosive. Through 鈥渉ydrodynamic鈥� experiments, the tungsten could be heated and compressed just like nuclear fuel to form a molten fluid.
Furthermore, inspectors used satellite images to identify a large and undeclared cylindrical vessel where up to 70 kilograms of high explosives could be safely detonated and contained in experiments to model compression and detonation.
Has any of this work continued?
The IAEA says that information supplied from two member states in 2008 and 2009 shows that Iran has been using sophisticated computer programs to simulate and model shock-wave interactions with metals, neutron flows and the effects of shock compression. That鈥檚 just the sort of preparatory data needed to design and build a warhead.
Was there anything in the programme that could only be aimed at nuclear weapon development?
One aim of Project 111 was to develop a prototype firing system that would enable a bomb to explode in the air instead of on impact. Experts the IAEA consulted said that the only likely application for this would be for a nuclear weapon rather than a chemical weapon or other type.
Most of the other projects could, at a stretch, be applied to conventional weaponry. But the combination of research on so many devices essential for nuclear weapons leads the agency to express 鈥渃oncerns about possible military dimensions to Iran鈥檚 nuclear programme鈥�.
So where does this leave Iran鈥檚 stand-off with other countries?
Despite the intense activity a decade ago, the message is that if Iran does have military nuclear ambitions, they鈥檝e been considerably blunted since 2003, and are still at a very rudimentary stage. 鈥淭here鈥檚 no indication in the IAEA report that Iran mastered the various processes involved in weapons design and manufacture,鈥� says Fitzpatrick of the IISS. That opens the door for increased international pressure and negotiation to resolve the stand-off. 鈥淭he White House has appropriately underscored that the US continues to focus on using diplomatic channels to pressure Iran to abandon its sensitive nuclear activities,鈥� according to a statement from the US Arms Control Association.
