SIMULATIONS of accidents involving nuclear weapons have revealed that the UK authorities were not fully prepared to protect people from being exposed to radioactivity, according to confidential reports obtained by 快猫短视频.
The revelations come in the wake of reports that the UK is considering replacing its existing generation of nuclear warheads, which are attached to submarine-launched Trident missiles.
Because the warheads need to be constantly refurbished, batches are shuttled by road convoy several times a year between the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston in Berkshire and the Royal Naval Armament Depot at Coulport in Dumbartonshire.
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The Ministry of Defence (MoD) regularly runs exercises to evaluate how the armed forces, emergency services and local authorities would respond to accidents en route. The exercises imagine crashes in which trucks carrying nuclear bombs burn, explode and scatter plutonium downwind.
In response to a request from 快猫短视频 under the Freedom of Information Act, the MoD released post-mortems of four exercises conducted during the past decade (see 鈥淭he road to disaster鈥�). They reveal that delays in issuing public warnings, poor monitoring of radiation and breakdown in communication could all have increased people鈥檚 exposure to radiation.
For instance, a 90-minute delay by the police in evacuating people from a contaminated area in the 2000 exercise resulted in radiation exposures to the public that were 鈥渧ery much higher than they would have been if action had been taken promptly鈥�, says a report by the MoD鈥檚 Nuclear Accident Response Organisation.
And in a 1997 exercise, advice given to the public on evacuation was 鈥渆rroneous鈥� and there were deficiencies in monitoring the spread of contamination, slowing down the response to radiological emergencies, the report says.
Communications were often hampered by faulty equipment, inadequate facilities and confusion over the correct units of measurement for radiation. Overall, more than 40 aspects of the exercises were rated as 鈥渦nsatisfactory鈥� by the MoD.
These problems are 鈥渧ery disturbing鈥�, says Frank Barnaby, a nuclear consultant who used to work at Aldermaston. But the MoD points out that there has been no accident in which radioactivity has leaked from the UK鈥檚 nuclear weapons. 鈥淓xercises are a powerful tool for verifying and improving the emergency response arrangements,鈥� says an MoD spokesman.
However, after the 1996 exercise, Aldermaston officials warned that a real accident might be much harder to deal with. 鈥淲e are possibly misleading ourselves into believing that we can manage the very real logistical problems of an actual response,鈥� they said.
THE ROAD TO DISASTER (from above)
Code name: Senator 2001
Scenario: A nuclear weapons convoy is involved in a road accident.
What went wrong: The Ministry of Defence accuses the police of 鈥渋neffective control鈥� and criticises the 鈥渨eak鈥� initial response of the civil authorities. A safety assessment of the nuclear warheads by the Atomic Weapons Establishment is four hours late.
Code name: Senator 2000
Scenario: A weapons truck smashes into a furniture van and a milk tanker.
What went wrong: The police experience 鈥渕ajor frustration鈥� because casualties are 鈥減oorly handled鈥�. The MoD takes only 鈥減iecemeal鈥� account of new science when assessing radiation doses from plutonium.
Code name: Senator 1997
Scenario: A gas tanker crashes into a weapons truck, destroying two warheads and scattering plutonium downwind.
What went wrong: The public are given the wrong safety advice. There is 鈥渁 lot of confusion鈥� between civil authorities, and ambulance crews are not warned of the risks before attending to casualties.
Code name: Senator 1996
Scenario: The conventional explosives in two warheads detonate after a media helicopter falls onto a bomb convoy.
What went wrong: Safety advice on shelter and food is hampered by a 鈥減olitically unacceptable鈥� lack of data from radiation monitoring. The transport is 鈥渉aphazard鈥� and there are shortages of medical supplies.
