You would expect the organisation responsible for ensuring biosecurity in labs working with dangerous animal pathogens like foot and mouth disease to know about any accidents that have occurred in those labs.
Not so DEFRA, the UK鈥檚 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Freedom of information requests made by 快猫短视频 have revealed that the agency has little idea of the number and nature of accidents and near misses at the 68 labs it has issued licences to.
Any lab seeking a licence must undergo an inspection to check it is equipped to deal with pathogens such as foot and mouth disease (FMD) and bluetongue. However, once licensed, it is left to carry out its own safety assessments. DEFRA merely asks it to report 鈥渨here biocontainment has been compromised resulting in an actual release, or where it potentially could have resulted in such a release, of the microbiological agent鈥�.
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Since 2004, only two such incidents have been reported 鈥� the escape of FMD from the Pirbright research facility in Surrey in August this year, and a leaking valve at the vaccine production plant owned by animal health company Merial on the same site in November.
鈥淭here will have been accidents at the other 67 labs,鈥� says Andy Mathieson, an environmental health expert at the University of the West of England, Bristol. 鈥淚t might not have been an actual outbreak but there will have been near misses.鈥�
DEFRA鈥檚 approach is in sharp contrast to that of the UK鈥檚 Health and Safety Executive (HSE), which regulates labs working with human pathogens. It requires labs to report all accidents and near misses. It then investigates these incidents and takes enforcement action if necessary. DEFRA says it carries out annual follow-up inspections at the labs it regulates, and if problems are identified they must be remedied.
Mathieson says this is not enough. 鈥淎nnual inspections allow for self-regulation. It beggars belief that the agency responsible for licensing isn鈥檛 keeping records of near misses,鈥� he says. 鈥淚f it has no record-keeping system in place, how can it assess risk?鈥�
鈥淚t beggars belief that the agency responsible for licensing isn鈥檛 keeping records of near misses. How can it assess risk?鈥�
Ed Hammond of the Sunshine Project, a non-profit organisation in Austin, Texas, that monitors the use of biological agents, says this is a glaring problem. 鈥淚f you only report when you鈥檝e actually leaked something, then it is a useless system. Accidents need to be reported so they become known more broadly and lessons learned can be incorporated.鈥�
Hammond recently uncovered similar problems in the US, where some labs have failed to report accidents to the authorities. 鈥淵ou have a similar problem in the UK,鈥� he says. 鈥淭he relationship between the funders, the regulators and the labs is all muddled up.鈥�
This could be about to change. On 13 December, a government review of the regulatory framework for animal pathogens recommended DEFRA be relieved of its role as regulator and hand over responsibility to the HSE. As well as regulating animal labs, DEFRA also commissions work from them 鈥� something the review chairman Bill Callaghan says is a clear conflict of interest.
鈥淲hile we don鈥檛 doubt the integrity of individual DEFRA officials, we don鈥檛 think DEFRA can distance itself from being a regulator and its compelling interest in ensuring the labs continue to operate,鈥� says Callaghan. He also recommended making biosafety guidance easier to understand, and giving regulators more tools to ensure labs comply with inspectors.
Mathieson says he would welcome the changes, but has doubts over the HSE鈥檚 ability to regulate animal labs. 鈥淚鈥檓 not sure there are enough inspectors to make it effective,鈥� he says.
