C332,652H492,388N98,245O131,196P7501S2340. Any guesses as to the chemical designated by this formula? It is, in fact, poliovirus. While we usually think of viruses as biological entities, Eckard Wimmer of Stony Brook University in New York state uses this formula to underscore the fact that poliovirus can now be synthesised in the lab. When he first demonstrated this in 2002, it was clear that the same technology could help terrorists manufacture viruses such as smallpox, but Wimmer鈥檚 team has also shown that viral synthesis can be put to good use producing weakened vaccine strains fast (快猫短视频, 3 June, p 16).
This is a classic example of 鈥渄ual use鈥� biomedical research. It is not hard to find examples of projects whose results could help terrorists design bioweapons (see 鈥淔riend or foe?鈥�). The big headache for governments is how to regulate such work. In the US, a panel called the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) is considering just that. It is developing a framework to help committees at universities and scientific institutions consider the bioterrorist implications of projects before deciding whether to approve them. This sounds reasonable, but consider how such a system might operate and the difficulties become clear.
First, research is an unpredictable activity: risks may only become apparent when results start to emerge. Second, a checklist will help 鈥� but who will do the vetting? Researchers, who have a clear interest in avoiding reviews, or institutional committees, which may then be overburdened? Furthermore, any system the NSABB recommends is likely to apply only to US academics. Biotech firms may opt to follow similar guidelines, but labs conducting classified research almost certainly will not. And dual-use research will continue unabated in nations less concerned about the risks.
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The last thing we need is for US academics battling the threat of emerging diseases to be mired in bureaucracy that creates a false sense of security. The NSABB should identify the worst dangers and throw up obstacles only to projects that veer into these areas. Scientific journals can also help, by giving biologists the space to explain the efforts they are making to minimise dangers inherent in their research. The abbreviated format of most scientific papers leaves little room for this.
The most important thing, however, is to educate students and young researchers about the dangers of dual-use research. Despite its massive investment in biodefence, the US government has so far provided no funding for education in biosecurity. It should address this deficiency as a matter of urgency.
