THERE is a Chinese saying that runs, 鈥淎bove, there is heaven; below, there is Hangzhou and Suzhou.鈥� The saying alludes to the legendary beauty of these two Yangtze delta cities: Hangzhou with its famous lake and Suzhou with its canals and celebrated classical gardens. The gardens of Suzhou are mostly very small, but they are made to appear large by cunning arrangements of twisting paths, each segment of which is hidden from the others by bamboo, dwarf trees and rocks of unusual texture and shape.
The designers of these gardens created a strikingly apt metaphor for Chinese society and government, both of which are rife with hidden paths, deceiving prospects and tricks of perspective. This picture is as true today as it was in classical times, and it is exemplified by news that the Chinese government is considering a freedom of information bill 鈥� something that to the untutored eye looks like a sea change, but which is probably anything but.
It is an enticing prospect: China throwing off its legendary obsession with secrecy and opening its gates to the world. Has Beijing finally decided to conform to global norms on transparency and the rule of law, perhaps to encourage investment by foreign companies which up to now have been nervous of China鈥檚 skewed and patchy legal system? That is optimistic. It is more probable that a freedom of information bill in the Chinese context is newspeak for precisely the opposite 鈥� namely, a law aimed at increasing control over access to information. Satellite broadcasting and the internet are exposing the Chinese people to huge amounts of information, and it is making their government distinctly uncomfortable.
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Fittingly, details about the new legislation are thin on the ground. It was spawned last year by China鈥檚 State Council, which instructed the China Law Society to set up a committee to draft the bill. That committee is now working on a second draft, but nobody seems to know when this will be finished, nor when or even if a freedom of information law will follow. Hardly in the spirit of a new transparency.
There is one area, however, in which the bill may be true to its name: in the corridors of the administration itself. To grasp this, it is important to remember that China鈥檚 culture of secrecy and manipulation of information so permeates society and government that ministerial departments, provincial governments and the separate regional military commands keep secrets not only from the outside world but from one another, and even from central government. The same is true to an even greater extent between offices and personnel within ministries, local authorities and military commands. There are many reasons for this extraordinary web of secrecy, including a fear of criticism, or of the Communist party leadership鈥檚 displeasure; the persistent Chinese urge to make everything look as good as possible and thus hide mistakes and failures; and jealousy and rivalries, not least between the different factions of the party itself.
This internal secrecy has been China鈥檚 undoing 鈥� it has turned difficulties into disasters. This is especially true with the spread of HIV and SARS. It is these in particular that have prompted China鈥檚 leadership to demand that different ministerial departments and provincial governments keep each other informed. Officials are still reluctant to break with tradition when it comes to China鈥檚 frequent industrial accidents and rural uprisings, most of which are obscured from public view by censorship 鈥� local authorities are encouraged to keep quiet when, say, a power station malfunctions or toxic waste pollutes a water supply. But the refusal all through the 1980s and early 1990s to accept that the country had a problem with HIV infection meant that it has become much worse than it might have done. And the absurd failures surrounding this year鈥檚 SARS outbreak, which stemmed from a blind refusal to acknowledge the existence of the disease in Guangdong province, damaged health and economies far beyond China鈥檚 borders.
In this respect, the proposed law is a positive move, and should ensure that future SARS-like outbreaks are better controlled and acknowledged. But as is the way with governments of all stripes, the Chinese will unquestionably seek to profit from the occasion by tightening up constraints on 鈥渦ndesirable鈥� information, both that being circulated within China and that coming in from outside. They already do this by jamming transmissions, imposing internet filters, monitoring emails and handing down harsh punishments to end users. Any new law will give the authorities the cosmetic advantage of legitimising what is already happening.
It would more appropriately be called the 鈥渇reedom to control information law鈥�. It is unlikely to involve the chopping down of bamboo screens along the winding paths of China鈥檚 secret garden.