快猫短视频

ELECTRONIC voting machines are threatening democracy, says Douglas Kellner, commissioner of New York City鈥檚 board of elections. This stark assessment is garnering increasing support, even as many US states and democracies around the world adopt electronic voting for their elections.

A mounting tally of problems surrounds the e-voting systems now being introduced in many parts of the US. The latest blow is a report highlighting security flaws in the 16,000 machines that the state of Maryland will be using for its presidential primary elections on 2 March. As the machines were being deployed, experts spoke to 快猫短视频 of concerns that whatever the problems of paper-based voting, electronic voting has fundamental flaws. They include a lack of transparency in counting votes, and problems with carrying out a proper recount or guaranteeing no voting fraud has occurred.

The arguments centre on the use of what are called direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines. Voters are guided through the choices in the ballot by displays on the screen, and cast their vote by touching the screen. The vote is recorded electronically on a memory card, which the election officer takes to a central location for counting when polling closes. Some DREs are also equipped with modems to transmit the results.

The machines have several obvious advantages. As well as automating the counting process, they promise a fairer experience for voters. The computers can display information in several languages, and accommodate the disabled 鈥� blind voters could use an audio interface for example. DREs can also help prevent spoilt ballots, by warning the user if their vote has not registered correctly.

Such issues were highlighted by the 鈥渉anging chad鈥� debacle in Florida during the presidential elections in 2000, when thousands of people鈥檚 votes were disregarded because they failed to punch their voting cards properly. Congress has since passed the Help America Vote Act, which set aside nearly $4 billion in aid for states that agreed to replace their punch-card and lever voting machines with ones that can ensure that all votes are registered as the voter intended, and provide multiple languages and disabled access. In response, several states, including California, Maryland, Georgia and Florida, plan to use e-voting machines for this year鈥檚 presidential elections.

But concerns about the reliability of the machines are mounting. Last month in Broward county, Florida, for example, DREs recorded 134 blank votes out of about 10,000 cast in an election that was decided by just 12 votes. Election Systems & Software of Omaha, Nebraska, which supplied the machines, says 134 people must have walked away without casting their vote, but some observers say that is unlikely in a simple election like this one, with just two candidates.

Security is also a key concern. Two weeks ago, RABA Technologies of Columbia, Maryland, published the results of an investigation into the security of e-voting machines from the manufacturer Diebold, at the request of the Maryland state authorities. Maryland is relying on these machines for its 2 March primary.

In the test, Michael Wertheimer and his team at RABA set up a mock voting station and tried various tricks to break into the machines. It proved astonishingly easy. The investigators were able to guess passwords on the smart cards voters use to access the machines, giving them administrative privileges and allowing them to cast multiple votes. They also showed how easy it was to erase results stored on a machine, or to intercept modem transmissions from the station and transmit their own fake results to the county鈥檚 central office. They even managed to hack into servers at county headquarters via a modem.

The state of Maryland is reluctant to update the software on the machines so close to the primaries. 鈥淭hey are frightened it will cause the election software to malfunction,鈥� Wertheimer says. So RABA has recommended various temporary solutions, such as tamper tapes and increased supervision of machines. Diebold spokesman David Bear says of RABA鈥檚 findings: 鈥淭he report said that no software changes need to be done prior to the elections and that voters should feel safe, secure and accurate in their votes in March.鈥� Wertheimer disagrees. 鈥淭hat is the most selective reading of our report imaginable,鈥� he says.

Manufacturers of e-voting machines argue that if any problems with accuracy or security are found, it will be relatively simple to correct the software. And other countries have gone electronic with apparently good results. Nearly 100 million people voted electronically in Brazil鈥檚 2002 elections. India used electronic voting in some state elections last year, and declared that its next parliamentary elections will be fully electronic.

But an increasing number of experts argue that apparent successes may not be as reassuring as they seem. 鈥淓very computer programme of reasonable size has bugs,鈥� says David Dill, computer scientist and e-voting expert at Stanford University in California. 鈥淭esting can reveal the presence of bugs, but not their absence.鈥� This means, he says, that we can never be sure machines have counted votes accurately, no matter how well an election seems to have gone.

The same reasoning holds for deliberate fraud. This is already a problem in banks and other financial institutions, but e-voting raises the stakes even higher, Dill argues. 鈥淧eople who win elections have control over a lot of assets,鈥� he says. 鈥淲hen you are talking about the US national government, it鈥檚 hard to get into numbers bigger than that, while staying on this planet.鈥�

With large contracts available to the manufacturers that supply and service the machines, earning the public鈥檚 trust won鈥檛 be easy. 鈥淲e are talking about several billion dollars a year,鈥� says Kellner. The fact that some of the companies involved are helping to run some elections in the US rings alarm bells too. The companies 鈥渉ook their network to the voting machines on the day of elections to watch things and make sure things go well,鈥� says Ted Selker of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a proponent of e-voting. 鈥淲e can鈥檛 have that.鈥�

Any perception that private companies have control over public elections can be hugely damaging. Diebold鈥檚 CEO, Warren O鈥橠ell, caused an outcry last August when he wrote in a fundraising letter to fellow Republicans: 鈥淚 am committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year.鈥�

There is no suggestion of foul play in this case, or regarding any other manufacturer. But the point is that it is not possible to prove an election has been fair, as there is no way to do an independent recount, says Rebecca Mercuri, an e-voting expert at Harvard University. Officials can print out what is stored in the computers鈥� memory, but there is no way to check it against voters鈥� intentions.

To try to get round this, Mercuri and others have argued for a paper trail to be logged alongside every electronic vote. After a vote is cast, the machine would print out a record, which the voter would confirm. These records can then be kept separately in case a recount is needed. But Selker says that this would be complicated, negating many of the benefits of e-voting. He suggests instead an 鈥渁udio trail鈥�, where the machine speaks the name of the candidate selected and is recorded by a separate computer.

But many remain staunchly opposed to e-voting. 鈥淭o me it is a fundamental part of democracy that the votes be counted in a completely honest and transparent process,鈥� says Kellner, who has been overseeing elections in New York City for the past decade. 鈥淲ith e-voting, we turn over the vote counting process to computer programmers, who in effect count the votes in secret. We have lost a fundamental part of our democracy.鈥�