IN THE north, an advancing army replete with artillery and tanks faces an enemy that has dug itself in. In the south, troops fight running battles with groups of enemy soldiers to defend their supply lines and wrest control of towns and cities. This is, of course, a description of the battle for Iraq. Yet it could apply just as well to the allied advance across France nearly 60 years ago. The US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld promised 鈥渁 war like no other鈥�, but 12 days into this campaign things look miserably familiar. No matter how high-tech the weaponry or smart the strategy, there is no new form of warfare here.
Rumsfeld has made much of his dislike of conventional military tactics. So instead of large armies, he readied massive stocks of laser-guided bombs and other high-tech weaponry which were to be deployed using superior information, also gathered by high-tech means. His intention, as he made clear in the days before the war, was to apply this technology in a burst of such uncompromising force that the Iraqi regime would see that there was no way to resist. The brutal reasoning was that this 鈥渟hock and awe鈥� tactic would ultimately mean fewer casualties.
The Pentagon let it be known that the Iraqi people were ready to kick out Saddam Hussein. Even his government had had enough. Just a firm nudge would topple him. Rumsfeld鈥檚 small, adaptable force would race to Baghdad to fill the power vacuum, and be welcomed as liberators. Even US commanders bought this line: 鈥淲hat we were really hoping was to just go through and everyone would wave flags and stuff,鈥� said one brigadier general this week.
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But Rumsfeld seems to have been blinded by American technological superiority. It seems reasonable that better technology could help to win wars while limiting the toll of dead and wounded 鈥� though it would depend on how it was used. The aerial bombardment of Baghdad, for example, may have destroyed Saddam鈥檚 ability to gather intelligence and control his forces. Yet it seems to have had little effect on Iraqi paramilitaries attacking supply lines south of the city or defending Basra.
High-tech weaponry also brings its own problems. Firing from afar at a thermal image or a blip on a radar screen can increase the likelihood of serious 鈥渇riendly-fire鈥� incidents (see 鈥淩ecognising friend from foe鈥�). Bad intelligence or wrongly entered coordinates can direct a cruise missile onto a civilian area. Such accidents are not only tragic for loved ones of those killed, but in Iraq, where the coalition is fighting to win hearts and minds, they do huge damage to its cause.
Most importantly, though, technology has its limits. When the enemy is easy to locate 鈥� in barracks, tank formations or dug into defensive positions 鈥� precision guided weapons are formidable. But when the enemy is in close contact or dispersed in civilian areas, their value diminishes. A night sight will not tell the soldier staring through it if a woman crossing a road is spotting for the enemy, and no amount of technology will identify a suicide bomber among a group of refugees.
The very fact that American and British forces are having to fight a guerrilla war is a failure for Rumsfeld鈥檚 plan. The Pentagon did not properly assess and act on its intelligence reports. Coalition troops went prepared for chemical weapons and to do battle with Iraq鈥檚 Republican Guard; they were not told to expect determined, low-tech resistance from paramilitaries.
Over the past week, we have learned that Saddam鈥檚 grip on Iraqi society is all-pervasive. Much of the fiercest opposition is coming not from the army, but from officials who grew rich on his policies. They have everything to lose if the coalition succeeds.
So how could coalition governments, with their superior intelligence gathering, have missed this information? It turns out they did not. Reports from several American intelligence sources warned that US troops could expect just this kind of resistance. The only conclusion is that the Pentagon put this threat low on its list of priorities.
It is clear now that coalition leaders misrepresented this war to the public. They sold it as a swift, clinical strike, relatively free of casualties. All laudable ideas, but patently unachievable. No matter how soon the conflict ends, the high-tech weaponry being deployed by the US and Britain has done nothing to sanitise war or place it in some new moral sphere. General Sherman鈥檚 description is as apt today as it was 140 years ago: 鈥淲ar is hell.鈥�