New British Philosophy: The interviews edited by Julian Baggini and Jeremy Stangroom, Routledge, £9.99, ISBN 0415243467 Reviewed by Mike Holderness
DO YOU ever wonder what philosophers do, or why? They seem to make such grand claims for the scope of their subject – as grand as science’s – but where do they come from?
Why not ask some philosophers? That’s what Julian Baggini and Jeremy Stangroom, editors of The Philosophers’ Magazine, did. They interviewed 16 plausibly up-and-coming philosophers working in Britain, starting with the question: why? Many only realised the subject existed when they realised they’d chosen the wrong degree. Some began with focused youthful enthusiasm for the Big Questions about the nature of existence and knowledge, before encountering actual philosophy and having their views turned around.
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And the results are weird stylistic hybrids, chopping between plain speaking and philosophers’ urges to talk shop to other philosophers. You may have to glide over clauses like “the kind of criticism Kierkegaard makes of the Hegelian tradition as he inherited it”. But if you’re a zoologist reading about quantum mechanics you probably glide over “the Hamiltonian”, no? And, just as one day you may get around to reading up Bill Hamilton’s use of matrices, you could do worse for intellectual stimulation than read up what Hegel meant by “the dialectic”. Later.
What you won’t get here is much that’s explicitly about the “philosophy of science”. You will get a partial view of the breadth of the subject “philosophy” – from unfashionable subjects such as aesthetics to crunchy stuff right on the border with mathematics. In particular, you’ll get several perspectives on the gulf between “Anglo-Saxon” philosophy and that which it derides as “continental”.
The latter group, stereotyped as woolly and “pretentious and portentous” doesn’t actually exist – it is simply the “Other” that Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy needs to define itself as a coherent movement.
Analytic philosophy, by contrast, drew dry inspiration from the heroic effort by philosophers Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead to put mathematics on a complete and consistent logical footing. No one’s come up with an unwoolly way to deal with the crisp proof by the mathematician Kurt Gödel, back in 1931, that it can’t be done. And, as the pro-continentals gently point out, the Anglo-Saxon project also self-destructs when confronted by the perennial question: “What do you mean by ‘know’, or by ‘you’?”
Such thoughts are extremely useful when you come to wonder what scientists do, and why. So do read this, then do that.