THERE has never been an information explosion like it. Researchers have already deciphered the complete genetic blueprints for one insect, two mammals, dozens of bacteria and a staggering 833 viruses. And more genomes are on the way: the umpteen billions of letters of DNA code now sitting in computer databases are just the start. The computing power needed to handle it all is reckoned to be doubling every six months.
That this mind-boggling quantity of information is going to transform medicine and biology is beyond doubt. But could some of it, in the wrong hands, be a recipe for terror and mayhem? That question is being asked with renewed urgency following last week鈥檚 announcement that American scientists have created from scratch the virus that causes polio, using nothing more than a DNA blueprint from the Net and materials sent through the post (see 鈥淗ow to make a killer virus鈥�). How worried should we be?
Anyone who thinks the achievement brings scientists to the cusp of being able to create or resurrect any life form or pathogen they like from scratch is succumbing to lurid fantasy. Polio is an unusually small and simple virus, and viruses themselves are simplicity itself compared with even the most basic bacteria. Making a hand-axe doesn鈥檛 qualify you to assemble a space station.
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So what was this polio experiment supposed to achieve? Critics have blasted it as an irresponsible stunt, and, yes, the research was bankrolled by the Pentagon, keen as ever to attract political support to the cause of fighting terrorism. But the scientists had no intention of releasing the agent, nor were they creating anything new or hard to find. Unfortunately polio is still out there in some parts of the world.
As for planting nefarious thoughts in people鈥檚 heads: terrorists and psychopaths surely have the brains to explore the terror potential of biotechnology unaided. If we are serious about combating their plots, it has to be better to know what might be going on behind closed doors.
A more compelling worry is that the experiment will divert security agencies from blocking more straightforward routes to bioweapons. Anyone warped enough to covet the polio virus as a terror agent could just go out and collect it, and then grow it. The same goes for a host of other nasties: foot and mouth disease, yellow fever, dengue viruses, all are out there. There鈥檚 no need to make them from scratch.
But some of the deadliest viruses cannot easily be got from the wild. Aum Shinrikyo cultists went looking for Ebola in Africa in the 1990s and failed. The genetic blueprints of these scarce pathogens really could be of value to terrorists. Ebola is one of the more likely viruses to be assembled from scratch. Larger viral rarities might be created by tinkering with the genomes of their more commonplace cousins. Neither deed is possible without access to the genetic information. And that is the real point of the polio stunt: to show in the most dramatic way possible that genetic information itself can be a potential weapon.
This is why scientists urgently need to rethink the way they handle some of this information. Most DNA sequences are posted on databases that anyone can access at the click of a mouse. The genome sequence for Ebola is no harder to download than that for peanut mottle. If no action is taken, the complete sequence of the deadly 1918 influenza virus will soon be available too. This cannot be a good idea.
Some claim maintaining open access is crucial to research aimed at preventing bioterrorism. Not so. Removing the genomes of certain pathogens from public databases need not impede any bona fide research. Legitimate labs could apply for licences to access the information. Even if complete control will never be possible, we could make the information harder to get hold of.
And that is what we should be doing. Our existing defences against the proliferation of bioweapons are feeble. Most industrialised countries have signed an agreement not to export certain pathogens without licences. But such controls become meaningless if you can make bioweapons using genetic recipes off the Net and viruses collected from the wild.
Academic freedom is never to be curbed lightly. Measures to restrict what scientists can publish have been mooted in the US and Britain in the wake of 11 September, and most have been excessive. But scientists really ought to accept sensible controls over the tiny bit of the genetic information explosion that could play into the hands of determined bioterrorists. The likelihood of someone unleashing something truly nasty may be small. But why take the chance?