THE demonstration that you can create many viruses if you know their genetic sequence (see opposite) comes just as scientists are fighting government attempts to restrict access to this kind of information.
Until now, countries鈥� efforts at preventing the proliferation of bioweapons have relied on limiting access to the pathogens themselves. So the 34 members of the Australia Group, which includes many industrialised nations, will not allow some pathogens to be exported without a licence.
But if terrorists can produce a bioweapon from genome information alone, the same logic suggests that access to genetic information should be restricted too. Last month, a meeting of the Australia Group in Paris agreed to 鈥渃ontrol, for the first time, the intangible transfer of information鈥� which could be used for chemical and biological weapons鈥�. The group鈥檚 members have not yet decided what this will cover. But they already restrict the export of critical pieces of DNA. This measure could be extended to posting sequences on the three big genome databases.
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快猫短视频s have long been aware of the potential dangers. The creation of polio, for instance, was forecast months ago in an essay in Nature Immunology pointing out that it would be simple to build an artificial polio virus.
Nevertheless, most scientists still oppose any attempts to restrict access to information. Earlier this year, the US Department of Defense dropped proposals for checking any research it funds for 鈥渟ensitive鈥� information before it is published, after scientists protested that this would impede research needed to defend against bioweapons.
鈥淲e are a good example of this,鈥� says Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University, whose lab developed a method of distinguishing between closely related strains of anthrax. 鈥淚f the Bacillus anthracis genome had not been released, we would not have been able to develop the high-resolution system that is currently so important [to the investigation of last year鈥檚 attacks].鈥�
Anthrax, however, still infects animals and sometimes humans, and samples are held in many labs worldwide. So there鈥檚 no reason for a terrorist to try to recreate it. The same isn鈥檛 true of Ebola, smallpox or the 1918 flu virus. Even so, when the American Society for Microbiology considered whether it should publish the smallpox genome, it reasoned that the benefits in terms of understanding the virus and designing drugs outweighed the risks.
Its position remains broadly unchanged even after 11 September. 鈥淚t is imperative that we win the war against bioterrorism without allowing biomedical science to fall victim in the enduring battle against disease,鈥� ASM president-elect Ronald Atlas said in December. In 2001, a group of experts at the US National Institutes of Health came to a similar conclusion when they discussed whether the sequence of the 1918 flu virus should be made public.
Not all scientists share such views. Raymond Zilinskas of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California thinks some limits should be put on the publication of information on organisms such as smallpox. 鈥淩ight now, there is no consensus,鈥� Zilinskas says. 鈥淢ost scientists feel that anything that is basic research should not be restricted. But where do you cross the line?鈥� He and others have proposed that professional societies and editorial boards at scientific journals should exert more control.
If they don鈥檛, the decision could be taken out of their hands. In addition to international measures, individual governments are also cracking down. The USA PATRIOT Act passed this year allows the federal government to stop some foreign nationals working in the US from getting access to certain pathogens and toxins. The US could extend this to cover access to genetic sequences as well.
And Britain鈥檚 Export Control Bill requires export licences for 鈥渋ntangibles鈥� that might lead to weapons of mass destruction. Despite opposition from scientists, the bill is likely to be passed by parliament next week.