KEEPING people in the dark about bioterror attacks is more likely to spark
panic than telling them what鈥檚 going on. When told the truth about a disaster,
people tend to remain calm and organise themselves to help others, experts in
risk communication say.
After the recent anthrax attacks in the US, public health officials were so
anxious to avert panic that they withheld information and distorted what they
did release. They felt that people couldn鈥檛 be trusted with the truth, says
Thomas Glass, an epidemiologist and social scientist at Johns Hopkins University
in Baltimore.
But that makes panic more likely, not less. People don鈥檛 normally panic when
faced with disaster, says Glass in a paper to be published in the journal
Clinical Infectious Diseases.
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In previous disease outbreaks, such as the 1918 flu pandemic, communities
organised themselves to help care for the sick and limit the spread of the
disease, says Glass.
He says they would probably need to do the same during a major bioterroist
attack, and involving the community should be an important part of any
biodefense strategy. Glass has studied people鈥檚 reactions to disease epidemics,
earthquakes and plane crashes.
Critics in Congress and the press have complained that the FBI failed to
release information during the recent spate of anthrax attacks, and the Centers
for Disease Control was slow to respond to questions. In taking this approach,
officials were ignoring well-known principles of risk communication, say
researchers.
鈥淚nformation was being withheld,鈥� says Vincent T. Covello, director of the
Center for Risk Communications in New York. 鈥淎 vacuum was formed. What happens
with a vacuum is that it often is filled with rumours.鈥� For instance, people who
reacted to the attacks by buying gas marks and stocking up on antibiotics were
accused of panicking. But given the uncertainty they faced, this was actually a
reasonable reaction. They thought it was the best way to protect themselves and
their families, says Glass. And some information given out was just plain wrong.
Postal workers were told they weren鈥檛 at risk, even though some later contracted
the disease.
David Ropeik, director of communication for the Harvard Center for Risk
Analysis, agrees that authorities should be more forthcoming.鈥漌e are more afraid
if we don鈥檛 trust the people who are supposed to protect us,鈥� he says.
Covello, Ropeik and others say federal officials ignored a large body of
research on how to communicate effectively about risk. Among other things, they
didn鈥檛 make a knowledgeable public health official regularly available for press
briefings. They withheld or played down some information about the danger, and
they didn鈥檛 give people a sense of what they could do to limit danger to
themselves.
鈥淧eople will not panic if you give them viable options,鈥� Covello says.