THE nuclear arms race has left the world with a terrifying legacy: 3 million
kilograms of bomb-grade plutonium and uranium. A terrorist would need no more
than a few kilograms to make a devastating bomb, so you鈥檇 think this material
would be kept under guard in secure military installations. You鈥檇 think so, but
you鈥檇 be wrong.
Radioactive materials are going missing, border controls are almost
non-existent, monitoring equipment doesn鈥檛 work and smuggling is rife. This was
the frightening picture painted at a conference of nuclear experts in Stockholm
earlier this month organised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Interpol and the World Customs Organization. It seems only a matter of time
before a terrorist group acquires the ultimate bargaining chip.
Terrorists don鈥檛 even have to get hold of enough to make a nuclear bomb, says
Friedrich Steinh盲usler, a physicist from the University of Salzburg in
Austria and a former member of the International Commission on Radiological
Protection. They could steal radioactive isotopes from unprotected research and
medical facilities with 鈥渞elative ease鈥� and combine them with conventional
explosives to contaminate large areas, or simply spread them through the
ventilation system of an airport, office complex or shopping mall. 鈥淪uch a
potential future scenario emphasises the low-tech terror of 鈥榤ass disruption鈥�
rather than 鈥榤ass destruction鈥�,鈥� Steinh盲usler says.
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Today鈥檚 leading terrorist groups, however, may have the means and the
determination to achieve mass destruction. These groups include Osama bin
Laden鈥檚 Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, which bombed US embassies in Dar es Salaam and
Nairobi in 1998, and Japan鈥檚 Aum Shinrikyo cult, which in 1995 released sarin
gas on the Tokyo subway. There is evidence that both have been trying to acquire
a nuclear capability, and according to the US State Department there are as many
as 130 terrorists groups worldwide that pose a potential nuclear threat.
If any of these groups is intent on building a nuclear weapon, the end of the
cold war has provided them with ample opportunity. According to
Steinh盲usler, up to a hundred countries may hold radioactive materials that
they can鈥檛 safeguard properly. In many of these countries, often former Soviet
republics, the soldiers guarding the materials are hungry and haven鈥檛 been paid
for months. And there are long stretches of open country across their borders
where, as Steinh盲usler puts it, 鈥渘o one checks what you have in your
谤耻肠办蝉补肠办鈥�.
Steinh盲usler, working with colleagues at Stanford University in
California, has just completed a study of nuclear security in 11 typical
countries: the US, China, Germany, Austria, Poland, Romania, Switzerland,
Israel, Brazil, Kazakhstan and Bangladesh. It reveals gaping holes in their
ability to detect nuclear smuggling, worrying flaws in their audits of
radioactive materials and serious shortages of trained staff, equipment and
resources.
None of the 11 countries has any radiation monitoring equipment covering its
unfenced borders, where there are few roads, railways or settlements. One of the
countries had no radiation monitoring equipment at any of its borders.
Although the study does not point the finger at any particular country, it
discloses that around a quarter of them do not keep registers of radioactive
sources that may have been lost from laboratories or hospitals. Half of the
countries knew of unlicensed radioactive material, and in nearly a third nuclear
material has been stolen from licensed sites in the past 10 years.
Steinh盲usler鈥檚 unnerving analysis was backed up by other studies
presented at the Stockholm conference. These include new figures from the IAEA
showing that the number of attempts to smuggle radioactive materials has doubled
over the past five years (快猫短视频, 12 May, p 6).
Some 10 per cent of the 370 incidents of illicit trafficking confirmed since
1993 have involved plutonium or enriched uranium, six of them since April 1999
(see Graphic). 鈥淚n most cases the quantity of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium encountered is small compared with the amounts required for a nuclear
explosive,鈥� IAEA analysts say, although these may simply have been samples of
larger quantities up for sale.
And the material that is intercepted may be just a fraction of what is
actually being smuggled. Ian Ray, a forensic nuclear scientist from the
Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe, Germany, estimates that only 5
to 10 per cent of the illegal traffic in radioactive materials is detected.
So why are so few smugglers being caught? One reason is that most radiation
monitors at border crossings don鈥檛 work, according to a survey for the IAEA by
the Austrian Research Centre at Seibersdorf. Out of 14 installed systems, 12
failed to meet the IAEA鈥檚 minimum standards for detecting radiation from
weapons-grade plutonium, and 11 out of 24 portable monitors either failed tests
or could not be tested.
Another study, by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, found
鈥渋mperfections in many national systems for combating illicit trafficking鈥�,
including inadequate laws, poor regulations, unclear lines of responsibility and
a 鈥渟hortage of suitable and modern equipment for monitoring and detection鈥�.
The US Department of Defense tried to improve this situation with a four-year
programme to train and equip police and customs officials in 17 Eastern European
countries. But it is far from satisfied with the results. 鈥淪ome recipient
countries have failed to demonstrate an earnest commitment to programme goals,鈥�
says the DOD鈥檚 Harlan Strauss.
Russia is the epicentre of the nuclear smuggling problem, and the US has
committed $2.2 billion to a programme aimed at ensuring that nuclear
material held there is secure. But a report from the US General Accounting
Office in February showed that after seven years only 14 per cent of Russia鈥檚
603 tonnes of weapons-grade material has been fully secured.
Norwegian scientists also criticise the programme for failing to cover
120,000 spent fuel assemblies from Russian submarines and icebreakers. Spent
fuel is usually regarded as 鈥渟elf-protecting鈥� because it is too radioactive to
handle safely. But a new investigation by the Norwegian Radiation Protection
Authority concludes that after 30 years or less the radiation will have decayed
sufficiently for terrorists to be able to extract enriched uranium and
plutonium. Despite the risks, the Bush administration has said that it intends
to scale back the programme.
Steinh盲usler believes that spent fuel from civilian reactors could also
be a danger. There is a already a 1000-tonne stockpile of plutonium from
commercial power stations, and recently declassified US documents show that it
can be made into bombs. The Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico has
even suggested that only 鈥渁 relatively low level of sophistication鈥� is needed to
make americium and neptunium鈥攁lso found in spent fuel鈥攊nto nuclear
explosives.
Nuclear authorities are starting to call for action. The Swedish Nuclear
Power Inspectorate wants the IAEA to set up a unit to combat smuggling. And
experts are meeting in Vienna this week to discuss plans to strengthen the
IAEA鈥檚 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
Others advocate a more direct approach. Phil Williams, an international
security specialist from the University of Pittsburgh, thinks police forces
should step up undercover operations to trap smugglers. More than 40 such
operations in six countries have had 鈥渃onsiderable success鈥� at catching
smugglers, he says.
Alex Schmid, head of the UN鈥檚 Terrorism Prevention Branch, warns that just as
nuclear weapons technology has spread to countries like India, Pakistan and
Israel despite the best efforts of the major powers, it may be impossible to
stop it spreading to terrorist groups. 鈥淭ime might not be on our side,鈥� he says.