FIVE years ago, 快猫短视频 asked biomedical researchers if they
thought genetic engineering could make a virus or bacterium more virulent than
nature鈥檚 worst. They replied that it would be difficult if not impossible, and
would need a colossal research effort. Now it鈥檚 clear they forgot one
thing鈥攖he unexpected.
As part of a programme to develop a contraceptive vaccine for mice,
researchers in Australia modified a mousepox virus to include the gene for a
chemical called interleukin 4. They hoped IL-4 would boost the animals鈥� antibody
levels. It may have done, but that鈥檚 irrelevant because to the researchers鈥�
surprise the mice all died. Adding the gene turned a merely nasty virus into a killer
(鈥淒isaster in the making鈥�).
The virus does not directly threaten humans. But splice the IL-4 gene into a
human virus and you could create a potent bioweapon. Add the gene to a pig
virus, say, and you could wreck a nation鈥檚 food supply.
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Vast amounts of time and effort have gone into policing the military鈥檚 use of
biotechnology. But the activities of civilian biologists have been ignored. Yet
genetic engineering techniques are now so widespread that potentially dangerous
results are bound to emerge accidentally.
So what to do about it? For a start, safety committees that vet research
proposals must be aware of all the potential pathways to harm. Yet more
stringent vetting will never catch everything. Ian Ramshaw, a member of the
Australian team, says could have foreseen that the altered virus would kill even
vaccinated mice.
There鈥檚 also the problem that many biologists choose to ignore
biotechnology鈥檚 threats. 快猫短视频 has found that neither
researchers nor biological societies are keen to discuss the misuse of genetic
engineering鈥攏ot least because they fear a backlash against their work. But
this attitude must change or biologists will find themselves sidelined when the
first really dangerous incident takes place.
Education and vigilance are key. One US proposal is that students in
biological subjects should not receive PhDs until they can show that they
understand how their work might contribute to making a weapon. And the
Federation of American 快猫短视频s is setting up a course to inform students
about the offensive threats posed by biological research, from the potential
dangers of lab work to details of the Biological Weapons Convention.
Another question is whether potentially dangerous results should be
published. Ramshaw鈥檚 team concluded that it is best for researchers everywhere
to be aware of what they found. They reasoned that there are so many avenues for
a bioterrorist to wreak havoc, one more wouldn鈥檛 make much difference.
But what about five more or 10 or 100? John Steinbruner of the University of
Maryland, College Park, has suggested setting up bodies to oversee areas of
biological research. Such bodies could question or even stop research, or decide
if results should be published. As Steinbruner is well aware, this proposal
strikes at the heart of scientific openness and freedom.
But leaving things as they are is not an option. Biotechnology is beginning
to show an evil grin. Unless we wipe that smile from its face, we鈥檒l live to
regret it.
