INTERNATIONAL efforts to ban germ warfare could get a shot in the arm
next week, as the 140 countries that have signed the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention meet in Geneva. They will debate whether to give the treaty
teeth by submitting to mandatory inspections from 1998.
The bioweapons convention, in force since 1972, bans the production or
acquisition of organisms, or any toxins produced by them, for offensive
purposes. It has not always succeeded. In 1992, Russia admitted that it had only
just shut down the biological weapons programme run by the former Soviet
Union.
The problem, says Graham Pearson, former head of Britain鈥檚 Chemical and
Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down in Wiltshire, is that 鈥渢he
convention has no provisions for verification鈥�. Unlike chemical weapons, which
need large production plants, biological weapons can be made in small
laboratories over a few days. It is also impossible to ban the raw materials
because most equipment needed to culture deadly organisms鈥攁nd in some
cases the organisms themselves鈥攃an be used for peaceful purposes.
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In 1994, scientists advising the bioweapons convention evaluated 21 measures
for assessing a country鈥檚 compliance with the treaty, ranging from yearly
declarations of all relevant facilities and work with biological material, to
inspections by international teams.
Since then, an ad hoc committee of members has been devising legally binding
measures. But progress has been painfully slow. 鈥淭he Biological Weapons
Convention has been at the bottom of the barrel of international treaties,鈥� says
Barbara Rosenberg, head of the bioweapons programme at the Federation of
American 快猫短视频s in Washington DC. 鈥淢any countries simply don鈥檛 have enough
delegates for all of them, so the ad hoc committee could meet only six weeks a
测别补谤.鈥�
But the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed earlier this year and the Chemical
Weapons Convention will soon come into force. This should leave the way clear
for the bioweapons convention. Chances of progress have also been boosted by a
change of US policy in favour of encouraging compliance, and fears about
bioweapons falling into the hands of terrorists.
The most important result of next week鈥檚 meeting, says Rosenberg, could be a
message to the ad hoc committee to get on with it. 鈥淚f it does, we have a chance
of getting proposals agreed by 1998,鈥� she says. Otherwise, says Pearson, 鈥渢here
is a danger the whole thing could slide until 2001鈥�, the next meeting of all
treaty members.
The outcome will depend on whether signatories start paying the treaty more
than lip service. The convention鈥檚 members have agreed to make yearly
declarations of all relevant facilities and research. But so far, only 75
nations have done so even once.
One of the most controversial issues at next week鈥檚 meeting will be a
proposal to send in an international team to inspect any installation at one
day鈥檚 notice, if a member country suspects another of breaching the treaty. The
proposal is not openly opposed by any country, say delegates heading to Geneva.
But some nations are trying to hamstring it by requiring a board of 40 member
states to approve inspections in advance.
Industrialising countries such as China and India are also unhappy with
proposals that installations figuring in a country鈥檚 yearly declaration can be
inspected randomly. But the only way to discourage biological weapons, says
Pearson, 鈥渋s to get many different kinds of information. If they all fit, we can
be confident.鈥�