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TRADE in raw materials and technology for civilian chemical industries
plays a significant role in the proliferation of chemical weapons. Several
developed nations export chemical processes and plant technologies for petrochemistry
and the production of fertilisers, pesticides and pharma ceuticals. Many
of these technologies, however, have dual uses; they can be shifted to the
production of chemical and biological weapons with relative ease.

According to Arend Wellmann, a researcher at the Berghof-Foundation
for Conflict Research in Berlin, the import of technology and raw materials
from Western Europe, and in particular from West Germany, is what has allowed
Iraq to develop a chemical weapons industry.

It was fairly simple for Iraq to attain self-sufficiency in the development
of mustard gas, says Wellmann. The main constituents, ethylene oxide and
hydrogen sulphide, are by-products of the country’s petrochemicals industry.
To make mustard gas, these two chemicals are mixed to form thiodiglycol.
Only hydrochloric acid needs to be added before the mustard gas can be used
in munitions.

Although Iraq would not have had much trouble producing mustard gas
on its own, it did receive Western help. Thyssen Rheinstahl Technick, a
large West German engineering company, refitted Iraq’s Petrochemical Complex
1 at Basra to produce ethylene oxide.

In the production of nerve gases, trade and technology transfer play
a more decisive role. There are several ways of making nerve agents but,
in all cases, the by-products are toxic and corrosive. The processing plants
must be equipped with tanks, pipes and pumps built from corrosion-resistant
materials, such as stainless steel alloys.

By importing raw materials, Iraq was able to refit plants already making
fertilisers, detergents and pesticides for the production of nerve agents
as well. The civilian uses provide a cover for the plant’s more sinister
production activities, making it difficult for the governments of the exporting
countries to halt or control shipments of technology and precursors.

According to Wellmann, smaller chemical companies in West Germany, such
as Karl Kolb, and its subsidiary Pilot Plant at Dreieich, are major exporters
of technology and raw materials used for the manufacture of organophosphorus
compounds. Pilot Plant earned an estimated DM 25 to DM 50 million (Pounds
sterling 8.6 to Pounds sterling 17.2 million) for supplying Iraq with what
has been described as laboratories for pesticide development, toxicity testing,
and a pressure vessel. Through a subcontract with another German firm, Quast,
Pilot Plant also supplied Iraq with plant fittings made of corrosion resistant
alloys. Other German firms supplied plant parts and also provided precursor
chemicals and trade and construction services.

But Iraq’s chemical weapons project was also serviced through exports
from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Chile, East Germany,
France, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the Soviet Union,
Turkey and the United States. In several cases, the exports were shipped
via a third country or in falsely labelled packages.

The complicated web created by a large number of small firms, based
in many different countries and trading through third countries, makes discovering,
monitoring and preventing chemical weapons trade difficult. The dual use
of precursor chemicals also makes it difficult to assess a country’s production
capacity of weapons.

Despite these challenges, nations are making individual and collective
efforts to control trade in the raw materials and technology needed to produce
organophosphorus nerve agents. Phosphorus oxichloride, for example, a key
to the production of several nerve agents, has been placed on a list of
44 chemical precursors compiled by the ‘Australia Group’ – a group of 20
countries, including the 12 EC nations, Australia, Japan and the United
States, which is attempting to control the trade in nerve agent precursors.

Last month, Germany beefed-up its export control laws in an effort to
restrict the trade in knowledge and technology required for the production
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. In both West Germany and the
Netherlands, companies that have violated their nation’s export laws have
been penalised.

But despite the recent conviction of Jurgen Hippenstiel-Immhausen, whose
company provided Libya with plants similar to those supplied to Iraq, Wellmannn
is not optimistic about the effect the strengthened laws will have on proliferation.
‘There are ways to circumvent the laws,’ he says.

Immhausen’s conviction has not stopped other companies from continuing
to trade. Immhausen did not seek the government’s permission to trade with
Libya. Hence its conviction. Pilot Plant, on the other hand, went to court
to get an export permit. It was granted. Last week, however, the general
manager of Pilot Plant was arrested on charges of supplying construction
plans for Iraq’s chemical weapons industry.

‘The problem with the laws,’ says Wellmannn, ‘is that they don’t make
the trade itself illegal, only trading without a permit.’ He added that
banning trade altogether would be difficult, and reiterated that the numerous
raw materials and technologies used to create organophosphorus nerve agents
also have many civilian uses.